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Discussions of the role of mathematics in finance appearing in The Mathematical Intelli-
gencer can be split into two classes. Marc Rogalski [26] and Jonathan Korman [18] capture a
widespread fury at a collapse in commercial ethics while Ivar Ekeland [6] and Peter Haggstrom
[13] offer economic facts. The conclusions of Rogalski and Korman can be summarised as that
mathematicians should spurn the financial world; Haggstrom and Ekeland point to techno-
cratic solutions, characterised by better regulation. I do not buy into the argument that the
problems of finance can be solved by regulations, it is, as both the U.K. and U.S. governments
have identified1, an ethical problem. But I also do not think it is virtuous for mathematicians
to spurn finance, so I am not completely aligned with Rogalski or Korman. My position is
that mathematicians should be forthright in presenting financial mathematics as a discipline
centred on the concept of justice, making it explicit that successful finance must be moral
finance.
During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 I was the U.K. Research Council’s ‘Academic
Fellow’ in Financial Mathematics, meaning my background is, like Ekeland and Haggestrom,
that of a financial mathematics ‘insider’. In this role I was expected to explain the discipline
I represented to U.K. policy makers, both in government and in the media. As I attempted
to meet these expectations I took an unconventional step for a mathematician and started
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looking into the origins of mathematical probability, both technically and the cultural context.
I noticed that in solving the Problem of Points, in 1654, Pascal and Fermat were pricing a
derivative contract on a binomial tree, and their solution would today be recognised as the
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein option pricing model, published in 1978. There was a difference between
the 1654 and 1978 models, CRR give a methodology for identifying the branch probabilities
on the tree, Pascal and Fermat assume they are a half. This raised the question: how did
Pascal and Fermat conceive the probabilities they used?
The answer came, initially, in some work the historian Edith Dudley Sylla did in the
process of translating the Ars Conjectandi. Sylla observes that
equity among associates or partners rather than probabilities in the sense of rela-
tive frequencies provided the foundation for the earliest mathematical probability
theory.[28, p 13]
and that
the foundations (. . . ) [were] not chance (frequentist probability), but rather sors
(expectation) in so far as it was involved in implicit contracts and the just treat-
ment of partners.[28, p 28]
Intrigued by this point, I followed the path of mathematical probability from the origins
of western mathematics in Fibonacci’s text on financial mathematics, the Liber Abaci, to
contemporary mathematics’ Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing. The Fundamental The-
orem is a consequence of Black and Scholes’ paper on pricing options [2] that is based on
the arbitrage argument, which originates in Aristotle’s discussion of justice in commercial ex-
change in Nicomachean Ethics and features in the Liber Abaci. The novelty of contemporary
financial mathematics is not in the techniques used, or the products traded2, but in the fact
2Most of these products existed in medieval times, the ‘Triple Contract’ shares the features of ‘structured
products’ prominent in the crisis. ‘Mortgage Backed Securities’ were introduced in the U.S. in the late nine-
teenth century – see [19, Ch 5] for an enlightening account. It is not in the interests of well dressed bankers
to tell their clients that what they are charging fat fees for existed before Columbus.
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that, today, mathematicians approach the problem of one of ‘positive’ science, not ‘normative’
ethics. For example, Black and Scholes opens with the observation that “it should not be
possible to make sure profits”3, appealing to a consequentialist argument that if you get your
price wrong4 someone will bankrupt you, where as medieval merchants were conscious of the
Catholic Church’s injunction that a riskless profit was turpe lucrum (filthy money).
Back in 2009, at the start of this journey, I took a position similar to Ekeland: there are
economic laws that “outweigh the puny might of mathematicians” and the solution is in the
hands of regulators. Today I have a darker view of the role of mathematics in the markets.
European science is often distinguished from other cultures’ science by the fact that it
is mathematicised and there is an argument, first offered in 19345 but developed more re-
cently [12, 17], that this came out of Aristotle’s examination of ethics in commerce. Justice
in exchange is distinguished from distributive and restorative justice by Aristotle as being
characterised by equality, “there is no giving in exchange”, it is a reciprocal arrangement
essential in binding society together and for social cohesion [17, p 51; 3, 1133a15–30]. It is
notable that Aristotle approached this ethical problem mathematically, since he rarely applied
mathematics to the physical world elsewhere [12, p 75; 4, p 13; 3, 1094b15–28]. On this basis,
the medieval Scholastic scholars realised that money was a universal measure, up until then
Hellenic thought (including Islamic scholarship of the time) had considered different physical
properties, such as time and space, to be ‘incommensurable’ – the idea of inertia was impos-
sible – and it was this property of money that enabled the development of modern physics
based on mathematics [4, 17]. To appreciate the point, Copernicus wrote on money before
he wrote on the planets; Stevin, founder of the influential Dutch Mathematical School, was a
financier; the financier Gresham endowed the first chair of mathematics in England and laid
the foundations for the Royal Society. Recently, Bernard Bru has explained the significance
3This is the basis of Ekeland’s argument.
4Ramsey’s ‘Dutch book’ argument, which has been described as a modern version of the ‘Golden Rule’,
“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”, Luke 6:31.
5By the Marxist theoretician Borkenau in The Transition from the Feudal to the Bourgeois World View.
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of Bachelier’s experience of stock-markets in the development of Kolmogorov’s ideas on prob-
ability [30, pp 20–21]. The close relationship between mathematics and finance is born out of
the fact that finance is concerned with relations, measured as prices, between objects. Finance
informs mathematics on measurement and uncertainty while mathematics is critical to finance
because we cannot perform experiments in the economy. It might not be possible to divorce
the two disciplines, even if we wanted to.
The classicist Richard Seaford offers some insight into this account when he goes into
the roots of western thought and argues that Greek philosophy, including democracy and
mathematics, are a consequence of Archaic Greece’s use of money [27]. He notes that other
ancient civilisations were based on centralised re-distribution, where as pre-Socratic Greek
society was based on exchange, reliant on a conception of equality and reciprocity. He suggests
that when the Pythagoreans assigned a number to every object, they were, in fact, pricing the
object.
The view that finance is socially corrosive is more novel than the practices of finance. One
way of approaching Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice is as a study of the four natures of
love – erotic, familial, friendship and the highest form of love – charity/caritas/αγαpiη – and
Shakespeare personifies charity in the form of Antonio, the merchant of Venice. Throughout
the seventeenth and eighteenth century, commerce was considered a civilising influence, in
The Rights of Man (1792) Thomas Paine writes “commerce is a pacific system, operating
to cordialise mankind” following a path laid by Montesquieu, Hume, Condorcet and Adam
Smith [15, 8]. After the Industrial Revolution, these attitudes all but disappeared and today it
would be inconceivable to personify Christian love in the form of a merchant. An explanation
for this cultural shift can be found in Dialectic of Enlightenment [1] where it is argued that
the Enlightenment led to the objectification of nature and its mathematisation, which in turn
leads to ‘instrumental mindsets’ that look to optimally achieve predetermined ends in the
context of an underlying need to control external events. Where as during the seventeenth
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and eighteenth centuries public spaces emerged, the public sphere, which facilitated rational
discussion that sought the truth in support of the public good, through the nineteenth century,
mass circulation mechanisms came to dominate the public sphere and these were controlled
by private interests. As a consequence, the public became consumers of information rather
than creators of a consensus through engagement with information [11].
One aspect of this process of alienation for the public is the attitude that mathematics
is an almost mystical pursuit that can reveal hidden truths, but only for the initiated, a
recurring theme in the presentation of mathematics in popular culture. This is nicely captured
in a documentary film on the development of the Black-Scholes-Merton equation where the
economist Paul Samulelson describes how he ‘discovered’ Bachelier’s thesis, much as Indiana
Jones might discover a magical artefact,
In the early 1950s I was able to locate by chance this unknown book by a French
graduate student in 1900 rotting in the library of the University of Paris and when
I opened it up it was as if a whole new world was laid out before me.6
This trope might seem benign in the context of popularising mathematics, but when com-
bined with the idea that mathematics is immutable and indubitable, themes of traditional
histories and philosophies of mathematics, we are given the impression, to paraphrase William
Tait, that
A mathematical proposition is about a certain structure, such as financial markets.
It refers to prices and relations among them. If it is true, it is so in virtue of a
certain fact about markets. And this fact may obtain even if we do not or cannot
know that it does. [29, p 341]
While mathematicians themselves might not make this claim explicitly, mathematics has been
used by many to obscure and legitimise financial activity, passing over any consideration of the
6The programme is ‘The Midas Formula’ also known as ‘The Trillion Dollar Bet’ and is avail-
able on YouTube. The relevant section is around 12:20/48:53 minutes. A transcript is available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/horizon/1999/midas script.shtml.
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ethical implications of those activities. Ekeland might see mathematics as ‘puny’, but others
value its authority and there are too many examples of how mathematics has been employed
to prevent democratic oversight of the markets. In their submission to the Parliamentary
Commission on Banking Standards in 2013 the Bank of England was highly critical of how
some firms have used advanced mathematical techniques to ‘pull the wool’ over the eyes of the
regulator [22, v. II, para. 89] while U.S. authorities identified that this type of mathematical
sleight of hand played a part in the ‘London whale’ episode [23, p 14]. The existence of the
Gaussian copula as a ‘truth-teller’ of the value of complex debt portfolios played a central
role in the Crisis of 2007–2009, justifying the actions of banks, despite its short-comings being
known to mathematicians [31, 21, 9]. In the early 1970s, the Black-Scholes-Merton framework
played an important part in legitimising the re-emergence of financial derivatives markets [20,
p 158]. As long ago as 1877 a large, corporate, insurer defended their actions in undermining
fraternal/mutual insurers to legislators with the argument that
There are certain fundamental rules . . . which can only be understood by actuaries,
and it is impossible for me to go into here [19, p 198]
An antidote to the causes and consequences of ‘instrumental mindsets’ identified above
is to turn away from the philosophical paradigm of Foundationalism, which sees language as
being made up of statements that are either true or false and complex statements are valid
if they can be deduced from true primitive statements. This approach is exemplified in the
standard mathematical technique of axiom-theorem-proof. An alternative approach is to shift
the focus from what language says (true or false) to what it does. Specifically, the function
of language is to enable different people to come to a shared understanding and achieve a
consensus, this is defined as discourse7 [10]. Because discourse is based on making a claim,
the claim being challenged and then justified, to be successful discourse needs to be governed
7According to a recent translator of Fibonacci, a key feature of the techniques given in the Liber Abaci was
that they enabled ideas to be transmitted and improved upon [7, Introduction].
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by rules, or norms. The most basic rules are logical and semantic, on top of these are norms
governing procedure, such as sincerity, and finally there are norms to ensure that discourse is
not subject to coercion or skewed by inequality. This is why reciprocity is central to financial
mathematics, it is a norm of market discourse, embedded in the language of mathematics.
Mathematics has not been passive in recent financial crises and I would argue that if
mathematicians are not part of the solution, they are part of the problem. For me, the correct
response of mathematicians to the financial crises is to work in support of those who wish
to redirect finance from regarding markets as competitive arenas to seeing them as centres
of cooperative, democratic, discourse8. In this vein I have developed the argument [16] that
reciprocity is the central message of financial mathematics and it is one of three norms of
market discourse, the others being sincerity and charity. For this case to be coherent I have
followed Putnam [25] and abandoned the idea of mathematics being a value-neutral truth-
teller, rather it is a means of discourse. This is a significant step if you perceive mathematics
as being monogamous with the natural and physical sciences, or even celibate. I believe
certain twentieth century mathematicians, such as Poincare´9 [14], Ramsey [5] and Putnam,
would have sympathy with the approach I take, particularly in the cases where mathematics
is employed in the social and human sciences.
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